Steps to the Constitution
Swaraj . . . will not be a free gift of the British Parliament. It will be a declaration of
India’s full self-expression. That it will be expressed through an Act of Parliament is
true. But it will be merely a courteous ratification of the declared wish of the people
of India even as it was in the case of the Union of South Africa . . . The British
Parliament, when the settlement comes, will ratify the wishes of the people of India
as expressed not through the bureaucracy but through her freely chosen
representatives. Swaraj can never be a free gift by one nation to another. It is a
treasure to be purchased with a nation’s best blood. It will cease to be a gift when we
have paid dearly for it.
This statement, made by Gandhiji in 1922,1 makes clear that the British did not introduce any
constitutional reforms or organs on their own initiative but alway s in belated and grudging
response to sustained Indian nationalist pressure. There is a my th which has been carefully and
often successfully purvey ed by British administrators and later neo-imperialist scholars that the
British initiated modern, responsible and constitutional government in India and that the
constitution was merely the culmination of the series of constitutional initiatives made by them in
1861, 1892, 1909, 1919 and 1935. This can be disproved given the fact that their concessions, at
every stage, fell far short of what Indians were demanding.
For example, the elective principle was first introduced by the British in the Indian Councils Act
of 1892. The Congress and its nationalist precursors, and the Indian Press, had been demanding
elections to the councils, elected majorities in them, and greater powers to the non-official
members of councils for many y ears before that. Nationalist demands had already far exceeded
what was granted in 1892.
It is also necessary to realize that nationalist demands were not just a little more advanced than
British practice: they were far ahead. When the Congress demanded that at least half the
members of the councils be elected, and that there should be male adult franchise, vote by ballot,
power to the legislative councils to vote on the finance bills, etc., the actual British practice in
India was that the Imperial or Central Legislative Council was a totally nominated body of a
maximum of seventeen members with an official majority and a few token Indian members.
The 1892 Act introduced elected members but they were still in a minority , and had very few
powers. On the other hand, the nationalists’ conception of the nature of India’s constitutional
framework was advancing rapidly . In 1895, there appeared the Constitution of India Bill, also
known as the Home Rule Bill, about whose authorship there is no conclusive evidence, but which
‘Annie Besant . . . thought . . . was probably issued under Lokamany a Bal Gangadhar Tilak’s
inspiration’,2 which conceived of basic human rights such as freedom of expression, equality
before the law, right to the inviolability of one’s home, right to property , etc., for all citizens of
India. Even the Government of India Act, 1935, the last British enactment, failed to satisfy the
repeated Indian demand, first made in 1895, for a declaration of the rights of the people of India.
The Indian leaders felt no necessity to abandon the constitutional legacy of the preindependence
period at the time of the writing of the constitution and start on a clean slate—this
was their own legacy for which they had fought hard and made many sacrifices. The constitution
could thus borrow heavily from the Government of India Act of 1935 because those who drafted
the constitution had no need to prove their independent credentials. They also believed that the
advantages of familiarity which existing institutions had should not be rejected. Since they also
freely rejected what was unsuitable in the old and added much that was new, they did not hesitate
to retain what was of value.
Swaraj . . . will not be a free gift of the British Parliament. It will be a declaration of
India’s full self-expression. That it will be expressed through an Act of Parliament is
true. But it will be merely a courteous ratification of the declared wish of the people
of India even as it was in the case of the Union of South Africa . . . The British
Parliament, when the settlement comes, will ratify the wishes of the people of India
as expressed not through the bureaucracy but through her freely chosen
representatives. Swaraj can never be a free gift by one nation to another. It is a
treasure to be purchased with a nation’s best blood. It will cease to be a gift when we
have paid dearly for it.
This statement, made by Gandhiji in 1922,1 makes clear that the British did not introduce any
constitutional reforms or organs on their own initiative but alway s in belated and grudging
response to sustained Indian nationalist pressure. There is a my th which has been carefully and
often successfully purvey ed by British administrators and later neo-imperialist scholars that the
British initiated modern, responsible and constitutional government in India and that the
constitution was merely the culmination of the series of constitutional initiatives made by them in
1861, 1892, 1909, 1919 and 1935. This can be disproved given the fact that their concessions, at
every stage, fell far short of what Indians were demanding.
For example, the elective principle was first introduced by the British in the Indian Councils Act
of 1892. The Congress and its nationalist precursors, and the Indian Press, had been demanding
elections to the councils, elected majorities in them, and greater powers to the non-official
members of councils for many y ears before that. Nationalist demands had already far exceeded
what was granted in 1892.
It is also necessary to realize that nationalist demands were not just a little more advanced than
British practice: they were far ahead. When the Congress demanded that at least half the
members of the councils be elected, and that there should be male adult franchise, vote by ballot,
power to the legislative councils to vote on the finance bills, etc., the actual British practice in
India was that the Imperial or Central Legislative Council was a totally nominated body of a
maximum of seventeen members with an official majority and a few token Indian members.
The 1892 Act introduced elected members but they were still in a minority , and had very few
powers. On the other hand, the nationalists’ conception of the nature of India’s constitutional
framework was advancing rapidly . In 1895, there appeared the Constitution of India Bill, also
known as the Home Rule Bill, about whose authorship there is no conclusive evidence, but which
‘Annie Besant . . . thought . . . was probably issued under Lokamany a Bal Gangadhar Tilak’s
inspiration’,2 which conceived of basic human rights such as freedom of expression, equality
before the law, right to the inviolability of one’s home, right to property , etc., for all citizens of
India. Even the Government of India Act, 1935, the last British enactment, failed to satisfy the
repeated Indian demand, first made in 1895, for a declaration of the rights of the people of India.
The Indian leaders felt no necessity to abandon the constitutional legacy of the preindependence
period at the time of the writing of the constitution and start on a clean slate—this
was their own legacy for which they had fought hard and made many sacrifices. The constitution
could thus borrow heavily from the Government of India Act of 1935 because those who drafted
the constitution had no need to prove their independent credentials. They also believed that the
advantages of familiarity which existing institutions had should not be rejected. Since they also
freely rejected what was unsuitable in the old and added much that was new, they did not hesitate
to retain what was of value.
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